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Spanish imperfecto and preterito : 
Truth conditions and aktionsart effects in a Situation Semantics 
Alicia Cipria and Craige Roberts 
§0 Introduction 1 
In this paper we have both a descriptive and a theoretical aim. The former consists in 
attempting to formulate truth conditions for the Spanish preterito and imperfecto tenses 
and in identifying the implications they each have for the aktionsart of the resulting 
clause; so far as we know, this has not been addressed previously in the literature on 
Spanish. While aspect (imperfective/perfective) is related to aktionsart, they are distinct: 
Aspect is a grammatical notion, reflected in morphological distinctions such as that 
between preterito (perfective) and imperfecto (imperfective), while aktionsart is a 
semantic notion, a classification of the events corresponding to clauses. As is often the 
case in human languages, there is no one-to-one correlation between the aspect of a given 
verbal form and the aktionsart of the corresponding event. We will argue that while the 
imperfecto will always entail atelic. aktionsart in the interpreted utterance, the use of the 
preterito will not necessarily result in telic aktionsart. We show that this follows from 
the truth conditions we suggest for these aspectual forms. 
We will formulate these truth conditions in a situation semantics of the sort originally 
proposed in Kratzer (1989). The use of this framework reflects our second, theoretical 
aim, which is to begin to explore how to enrich this framework with a semantics for tense 
and aspect. Again, this is a subject which, so far as we know, has not yet been 
systematically explored, and, of course, the present study only represents a modest 
beginning. But it already presents some interesting problems which may be useful to 
keep in mind in subsequent work, whether 011 Spanish or other languages. 2 
In what follows, we first, in § 1, give a brief overview of the traditionally observed 
meanings of the preterito and imperfecto. In §2, we consider the associated aktionsarten. 
In §3 we offer our truth conditions, briefly discussing some of the relevant issues which 
1This paper was presented in an earlier form at the Georgetown C'niversity Roun'dtable on Language and 
Linguistics, in the Presession on Spanish Linguistics, in March, I 995. We are grateful to Jae-Huk Yoon, 
Andreas Kathol, David Dowty, and Paul Portner for helpful discussions on various points. 
2See Cooper ( 1986) for an earlier discussion of (English) tense within situation semantics. 
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arise in introducing temporal factors into a situation semantics. And in §4 we consider 
how these truth conditions account for the readings discussed in § 1. 
§1 Observed meanings of the preterito and imperfecto 
§1.1 Preterito 
The Spanish preterito, exemplified by (I a) and ( 1 b), is generally said to make an 
unambiguous contribution to the meanings of expressions in which it occurs, with a sense 
which is often said to be punctual, terminative, or definite. 
(1) a. Lleg6 el tren. 
arrive-3sg. PRET the train 
'The train arrived.' 
b. Teresa canto en el teatro. 
Teresa sing-3sg. PRET in the theater 
'Teresa sang in the theater.' 
The terminative character seems to reflect the fact that events corresponding to preterito 
clauses are taken to have an end, e.g. in (la), the train's arrival is a culmination, an end of 
the trip. When definiteness is invoked, the point seems to be that the entire event is 
referred to, as opposed to some indefinite subpart; hence, e.g., (I b) might be taken to 
refer to the entire event of Teresa's singing in the theater, as opposed to some subevent of 
her singing there. We will argue that these senses are captured by a requirement that the 
event(s) corresponding to a preterito clause have a definite termination point, or end­
point, in contrast to the events corresponding to imperfecto clauses. The relationship to 
the terminative sense is obvious and direct, that to the definite and punctual senses less 
so, mediated by aktionsarten. The preterito, unlike the impe1fecto, may denote a telic 
aktionsart; this aktionsart in turn entails the definiteness, in the relevant sense, of the 
event in question; and it influences the way that a Reference Time is established in 
discourse and leads to the impression that the corresponding event is viewed as punctual 
relative to other events under discussion. We'll review how these effects arise below. 
§1.2 lmperfecto 
Traditional discussions of the impe1fecto propose various meanings for different tokens, 
including.progressive, habitual, and intentional; hence at first glance it appears to be 
ambiguous. The imperfecto is often said as well to convey a durative, continuous, or 
indefinite sense: durative, as opposed to the punctual sense of the preterito, continuous 
as opposed to the terminative character of the preterito , and indefinite in the sense that 
some nonspecific subpart of the event is referred to, in contrast to the preterito , which 
refers to the event in its entirety. 
To illustrate the different senses of the imperfecto, consider (2a). Its different possible 
interpretations may be suggested by the context, or by modifying adverbials like those in 
(2b-d): 
(2) a. Ibamos a la playa. 
go- l plu.IMPF to the beach 
'We went/ were going/used to go to the beach .' 
The temporal adverbial clause in (2b) suggests a progressive reading. 
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(2) b. Ibamos a la playa cuando nos encontramos con Miguel . 
go-lplu.IMPF tothebeach when RECPR.meet-lplu.PRET with Miguel 
'We were going to the beach when we ran into Miguel.' (progressive) 
The adverbial los domingos in (2c) suggests a habitual reading. 
(2) c. Ibamos a la play a los domingos. 
go- I plu.IMPF to the beach on Sundays 
'We went/used to go to the beach on Sundays.' (habitual) 
In (2d) the "intention-in-the-past" reading is clear: 
(2) d. Hasta ayer, fbamos a la play a de vacaciones, 
until yesterday go- I plu.IMPF to the beach on vacation 
pero hoy Pepa dijo que no hay dinero para eso. 
but today Pepa say-3sg. PRET that not there is money for that 
'Up until yesterday we were going to the beach on vacation but today Pepa said 
that there is no money for that.' (intention-in-the past) 
Examples like those in (4), patterned after the English example due to Dowty (1987) i.n 
(3), help to clarify the distinction between the progressive and the intentional readings: 
(3) Lee was going to Radcliffe until she got accepted by Parsons. 
(4) a. Laura iba a Radcliffe hasta que Parsons la acept6. 
Laura go.IMPF to Radcliffe until Parsons her accept.PRET 
'Laura was going to Radcliffe until Parsons accepted her.' 
b. Laura estaba yendo a Radcliffe hasta que Parsons la acept6. 
Laura be.IMPF going to Radcliffe until Parsons her accept. PRET 
'Laura was going to Radcliffe until Parsons accepted her.' 
c. Laura iba air a Radcliffe hasta que Parsons la acept6. 
Laura go.IMPF to go to Radcliffe until Parsons her accept. PRET 
'Laura was going to go Radcliffe until Parsons accepted her.' 
(4a) is ambiguous between the two types of readings. (4b), with a past progressive, is 
synonymous with the progressive reading of (4a), while (4c), with the periphrastic future 
ir a, is synonymous with the intentional reading. Note that one of these readings might 
be true while the other is false, underlining their non-synonymity. For example, for (4b) 
to be true, Laura must already be at Radcliffe when she learns that Parsons has accepted 
her, while this need not be the case with (4c). 
There is another meaning which the imperfecto is sometimes said to have, the iterative; 
we will illustrate this further below. The iterative and the three meanings for the 
imperfecto that we have just examined all have two things in common. First, they 
involve reference to a past time. Second, they display atelic aktionsart, a notion which 
we turn to now. 
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§2 Aktionsarten and the imperfecto andpreterito 
We assume a truth conditional semantics in which sentences denote propositions, where 
propositions are classically taken to be sets of worlds or situations. But it has long been 
clear to those who work on tense and aspect that sentences and the clauses they consist of 
allude as well to the existence of various kinds of events or states. In §3, we will discuss 
how the propositions expressed by clauses are related to these events or states. For the 
moment, it suffices to acknowledge the correlation. 
The aktionsarten constitute a classification of eventualities, where eventualities arc either 
events or states. By extension, one talks of the aktionsart of a given clause on the basis of 
the aktionsart of the event or state correlated with the proposition it expresses. And we 
often talk of the aktionsart of predicates, defined in terms of the aktionsart of simple 
clauses in which it occurs as main predicate. There arc two major classes of aktionsarten: 
telic and atelic.' Thus, we often speak of the aktionsart of a given clause or predicate as 
its felicity . The characterization used here is that of Dowty ( 1979, 1987), who draws in 
turn on Kenny ( 1963). 
Atelic aktionsarten may be states (e.g. saber 'know', querer 'want', vivir 'live') or 
processes (e.g. correr 'run', llover 'rain', esc,ichar 'listen'). In general, telic situations 
involve the achievement of a goal or some resulting stale; they may be simple (e.g. win 
the co/If est ) or complex (e.g. write the dissertation ). There is one property that centrally 
distinguishes the atelic from the telic aktionsarten, which we call the subinterval 
property. Informally, we can say that if a state or process holds at some interval of time 
then it also holds at any subinterval of that interval, so that, e.g., if it is true at an interval 
of an hour that I know something, I also know it at any subinterval of that hour 
(distributivity). Also, its truth at the hour-long interval does not exclude the possibility 
that there may also be a super-interval, say of two hours, during which the same state or 
process is true (cumulativity). Dowty ( I 987) formally defines atelicity for predicates in 
terms of the subinterval property, as shown in (5): 
(5) The Subinterval Property for Atelic Aktionsarten 
If 8 is an atelic predicate, then necessarily, 8(x1 , ... ,x11) is true for interval/ 
if and only if 8(x1 , ...,x,,) is true for all subintervals /' of I. 
The predicted entailments are illustrated for the process of running in (6): 
I (6) · a. Jaimito corri6 de 4 a 5. 
Jaimito run. PRET from 4 to 5 
'Jaimito ran from 4 until 5.' 
b. Jaimito corri6 de 4 a 4:30. 
Jaimito run. PRET from 4 to 4:30 
'Jaimito ran from 4 until 4:30.' 
Because the interval from 4 to 4:30pm is a subinterval of that from 4 to 5pm, the atclicity 
of correr is reflected in the fact that (6a) entails (6b) (distributivity). Similarly, this 
permits us to say that if Jaimito runs during the period from 4 to 5pm and also during the 
period from 5 to 6pm, it is also true that he runs from 4 until 6pm (cumulativity). 
Telic aktionsarten do not have the subinterval property, and in fact if a telic event is true 
at an interval, none of its proper suhintervals will verify an instance of the same type of 
event. Thus, we can only say that a telic like (7) is true at the maximal interval which it 
took for Jaimito to write the poem in question. 
'These terms were first introduced by Garey ( 1957). 
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(7) Jaimito escribi6 un poema. 
Jaimito write.PRET a poem 
'Jaimito wrote a poem.' (telic) 
If (7) is true at an interval i, we cannot say that it is true at any subintervals of i, at least 
for the same poem (though of course, the progressive version of (7) or its English 
counterpart may be true at a subinterval of i ). From this it also follows that if (7) is true 
of the interval from 4 to 5pm and then again of \he interval from 5 to 6pm, it is not true at 
the interval from 4 to 6pm, though we could say that it is true at the larger interval that 
Jaimito wrote two poems. 
Dowty ( 1987) formally defines telicity as in (8): 
(8) If 8 is a telic predicate, then the truth of 8(x1 ,... ,x11) for interval / entails that 
8(x1 ,...,x11) is false for all proper subintervals /' of/. 
The telicity or atelicity of a clause is not determined by its verb alone. Rather, the 
presence of certain argument NPs, adverbial phrases, or aspectual markers on a verb can 
yield a different aktionsart from the one suggested by the verb in isolation. To see how 
non-verbal elements contribute to aktionsart, observe that often in English sentences with 
a simple past tense verb, an argument NP whose head is a count noun .will yield telic 
aktionsart for the whole clause, whereas a mass NP will yield atelicity; this is illustrated 
in (9a) and (9b): 
(9) a. Oil flowed through the pipes. (atelic) 
b. 3000 liters of oil flowed through the pipes. (telic) 
(9a) may be true both at an interval i and at subintervals of i. But on at least one reading 
of (9b ), which may be the easiest reading to access out of the blue, if it is true at i, then 
though (9a) will be true at subintervals of i, (9b) itself will not be true at those 
subintervals. The measure phrase in (9b) sets the boundaries on the event's duration: 
Once the measure is achieved, the event is completed, but not before. 
The facts are somewhat different for Spanish, given the distinction between preterito 
and imperfecto. The use of the imperfecto will always imply atelicity, while the 
preterito will not necessarily imply telicity, as we already saw in (6) above. We claim 
that this should follow from the truth conditions associated with each of these verbal 
tense/aspect forms, so that in the case of the impe1Jecto, atelicity is part of its core 
meaning. Thus, example (11) with an impe1fecto verb and the count NP 3000 litros de 
petr6leo has the same aktionsart (atelic) as the proposition in (10), with the mass noun 
petr6leo : 
( I 0) Corrfa petr61eo por las caiierfas. 
flow-3sg. IMPF oil through the pipes 
'Oil flowed/was flowing through the pipes.' (atelic) 
(11) Corrfan 3000 litros de petr61eo por las caiierfas. 
flow-3pl.IMPF 3000 liters of oil through the pipes 
'3000 liters of oil flowed through the pipes.' (atelic) 
Examples ( I 0) and ( 11 ), like (9a), are atelic because if one of them is true at an interval i, 
it is true to say of any given subinterval of i that oil (in the case of ( 11 ), 3000 liters of it), 
was flowing at that subinterval. To imagine when (11) would be true at an interval i, 
suppose we have a circular pipe that can hold exactly 3000 liters and oil keeps flowing 
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around in it continuously; then it is true for a given subinterval of i that "3000 liters of 
oil were flowing" during that subinterval. Also, (I 0) and ( 11) have a habitual reading, 
even without an adverb such as diariamente/por d{a 'daily/per day'. In the proper 
context or with an appropriate adverbial modifier, (9b) can have this habitual reading as 
well. In retrospect, we can see that (9b) may also have the non-habitual reading of (11 ); 
however, unlike (9b), (11) has no telic reading. 
The examples with the imperfecto which we considered earlier were all atelic. So, in 
(2b) the subsituations of the event of "going to the beach" are instances of "going to the 
beach" as well. (2c) says that it was a habit of ours to go the beach on any normal 
Sunday during some past period of time; it entails that our having this habit would also be 
true of any subperiod of that period. Notice that this does not rule out the possibility that 
on one Sunday during that period we didn't go to the beach, for example because we had 
to attend a meeting or we were sick, since with the habitual we are dealing with what was 
the typical or usual case. With the intentional reading illustrated by (2d), the intention to 
go to the beach holds over some past interval, and also, then, over any sub.interval of that 
interval. 
But the preterito is, as noted, compatible with either aktionsart. In (12), with the 
preterito and the mass NP argument petr6/eo, the proposition has atelic aktionsart (cf. 
(9a)). The measure phrase in ( 13) interacts with the end-point requirement of the 
preterito (and the meaning of the predicate) to entail telicity: 
(12) Corrio petr61eo por las caiierfas. 
flow-3sg.PRET oil through the pipes 
'Oil flowed through the pipes.' (atelic) 
(13) Corrieron 3000 litros de petr61eo por las cafierfas. 
flow-3plu.PRET 3000 liters of oil through the pipes 
'3000 liters of oil flowed through the pipes.' (telic) 
Like (9a), (I 0) and (II), example ( 12) has an atelic reading because it is true to say of 
any given subinterval of the flowing process that oil was flowing at that subinterval. ( 13) 
has a telic interpretation, with the same sense as the telic reading of (9b): If it is true at 
some past interval i that 3000 liters of oil flowed non-circularly through the pipes at i, 
then it is not true that 3000 liters of oil flowed through the pipes at any subinterval of i ; 
instead only some part of the 3000 liters flowed during any subinterval of i. 
Like (9b), (13) can have a habitual, i.e. atelic, interpretation as well in the proper context; 
but the point here is to contrast it with (11 ), which does not have a telic reading. Uttered 
out of the blue, the telic reading of (13) is the default. We take this to be pragmatically 
motivated: since the imperfecto can have only the atelic reading, when that is the 
meaning the speaker wishes to convey the use of the imperfecto is less likely to lead to a 
misunderstanding than that of the often telic preterito. Among others, Horn ( I 984a, 
1984b) has argued that when we have two elements. in a paradigm, one unmarked for 
some feature and the other marked, the use of the unmarked element will tend to take on 
the interpretation which is not possible for the marked element; he illustrates this with a 
number of lexical items and argues that it is motivated by Gricean principles, principally 
the Maxim of Quantity, which would lead the cooperative speaker to use the more 
informative marked form if it were applicable. We would argue that the default character 
of the telic interpretation of the preterito is another instance of the sort of phenomenon 
that Horn has discussed: the preterito may display either aktionsarten and hence is the 
unmarked element, while the imperfecto may only lead to an atelic interpretation, so that 
it is marked. Hence, by the maxim of Quantity, there is a tendency to interpret the 
preterito as telic if the imperfecto could have been used instead to unequivocally yield 
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the atelic. However, in certain contexts, partly because of the discourse effects of the 
preterito vs. the imperfecto, to be discussed in §3.3.2 below, the preterito may be 
preferred even though an atelic interpretation is intended. For example, we might utter 
(13) in the following context: 
( 13') Normalmente, corrian 1500 litros de petr61eo por las caiierfas, pero una vez, 
usually flow-impf liters of petroleum through the pipes but one time 
en 1985, a causa de un desperfecto, corrieron 3000 litros de petr6leo (por las 
in due to a malfunction flow-pre! liters of petroleum through the 
caiierias) hasta que se soluciono el problema. 
pipes until solve-pre! the problem 
'Usually, 1500 liters of oil flowed/were flowing through the pipes. But once, in 
I 985, due to some malfunction, 3000 liters were flowing (through the pipes) until 
the problem was solved.' 
Here, the preterito form corrieron has an atelic reading. The possibility of contextually 
overriding the default in (13), argues that the tendency for a telic interpretation of the 
preterito is indeed only pragmatic, a Gricean conversational implicature, and not part of 
its truth conditional semantics. 
The examples in (15) illustrate how the temporal adverbials por una hora and en una 
hora, like their English counterparts for an hour and in an hour in ( 14), may also affect 
aktionsart: 
(14) a. Frida rehearsed the libretto for an hour. (atelic) 
b. Frida rehearsed the libretto in an hour. (telic) 
(15) a. Frida ensayaba el libreto por una hora. 
Frida rehearse.IMPF the libretto for an hour 
'Frida used to rehearse/was rehearsing the libretto for an hour.' 
(atelic: habitual or progressive) 
b. Frida ensayaba el libreto en una hora. 
Frida rehearse .IMPF the libretto in an hour 
'Frida rehearsed/used to rehease/was rehearsing the libretto in an hour.' 
(telic: inchoative; or atelic: habitual, progressive, or intentional) 
c. Frida ensay6 el libreto por una hora. 
Frida rehearse.PRET the libretto for an hour 
'Frida rehearsed the libretto for an hour.' (atelic: iterative or progressive). 
d. Frida ensay6 el libreto en una hora. 
Frida rehearse .PRET the libretto in an hour 
'Frida rehearsed the libretto in an hour.' (telic) 
It is argued in the literature on English that for an hour requires that its argument, the 
clause within its scope, be atelic in aktionsart, while in an hour requires telic aktionsart. 
English Frida rehearsed the libretto may be within the scope of either adverbial, because 
it is indeterminate with respect to aktionsart, yielding either a telic reading as argument 
for in an hour· (where the complete rehearsal takes place) or an atelic argument for for an 
hour (where the libretto was worked on without necessarily getting through the entire 
piece). If the Spanish counterparts to these adverbials work similarly, we predict that the 
atelic imperfecto may occur with por una hara 'for an hour' to yield the habitual or 
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progressive readings in (l Sa), and that the preterito can yield whatever aktionsart is 
required for the advcrhial, i.e. either atclic reading for par una hara, or else telic for en 
una hura 'in an hour'. But we correctly predict that the i111pe1fecto in (]Sb) cannot 
occur with en una hora to yield the telic reading we find in ( I Sc!). 
The telic interpretation noted for (!Sb) might appear to be a counterexample to the 
generalization that the impe1fecto always yields atelic actionsart. However, this reading 
docs not share the truth conditions available for (I Sd), where the entire rehearsal look one 
hour. In general, when a tclic adverbial like en wza hara/in an hour occurs with an ,1telic 
clause, one way of making the result felicitous is to shift to an inchoative interpretation, 
where the endpoint of the hour period marks the beginning of the process or state 
corresponding to the atelic clause-here, the process of rehearsal. We can see this in 
English if we give in an hour wide scope over the progressive, which is always atelic: 4 
(14) c. Frida was rehearsing the libretto in an hour. (telic: inchoative) 
Since the only telic reading available for ( I Sb) is the inchoative, the impe1fecto patterns 
with the atelic English progressive, as expected. The other readings available for ( 15b) 
may be accounted for by assuming that in them the adverbial takes as its argument the 
tensc/aspcctless enmyar el lihreto, which is indeterminate with respect lo aktionsart, like 
its English counterpart; the imperfecro then applies to the resulting clause lo yield atelic 
aktionsart. 
The preceding discussion would suggest that ( I Sci) has the same ,ltelic readings as those 
noted for (!Sb). These readings do not seem to be available. We would offer, again, a 
pragmatic explanation for this fact, i.e. that the availability of the unambiguously atelic 
impetj'ecto strongly favors it over the ambiguous preterito in such cases. 
An endpoint ,idverbial ~uch as to the srarela la tienda may similarly suggest telic 
aktionsart, as illustrated in (16-17), but this effect is overridden by the impe1fecto in 
( 18), which has only an atelic (habitual or progressive) interpretation: 
(16) Juana ran to the store. (lclic) 
(17) Juana corri6 a la tienda. 
Juana nm .PRET to the store 
'Juana ran to the store.' (telic) 
( 18) Juana corria a la lienda. 
Juana nm .IMPF to the store 
'Juana ran/was running to the store.' (atelic: habitual or progressive) 
Summarizing, it is interesting to note that the use of the impe1jecto, with at least three 
attested meanings (progressive, habitual, and intentional), always results in a single 
aktionsart, the atclic; while the preterito , with an apparently unitary meaning, can 
display either telic or atelic aktionsart. This will follow from our truth conditions, to 
which we will turn in the next section. 
First, though, Jet us be more precise about what we mean when we say that a given 
clause, or the proposition it denotes, displays telic or atelic aktionsarl. In Dowty ( 1979) 
and subsequent work on English tense and aspect, it is assumed that aspectual markers 
like the Progressive have scope independent of the scope of tenses like the Past or 
"(14c) also has an habitual rcading 1 of course. The inchoative is the only interpretation when the adverbial 
in an hour is scntcncc~initial. 
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Present. E.g., in Dowty the Progressive has VP scope, while tenses have sentential scope. 
This assumption is crucial to the treatment of aktionsart in English, e.g. in the English 
( 14b ), repeated here: 
(14) b. Frida rehearsed the libretto (in an hour). 
Consider the usual truth conditions for such a sentence: The Past tense leads to a shift in 
the course of interpretation from the Speech Time to a time which is past relative to the 
Speech Time; call this pasttime the Event Time, following Reichenbach. The sentence 
will be true at the Speech Time iff there is a past Event Time at which 'Frida rehearse the 
libretto' is true. Note that (14b) will also be true for any subinterval of the Speech Time, 
since the Event Time which makes 'Frida rehearse the libretto' true in the past relative to 
the Speech Time will be past relative to subintervals of the Speech Time as well. Hence, 
if we consider the Speech Time and its subintervals, (14b) appears to display the 
Subinterval Property for Atelic Aktionsarten given in (5) above. But (14b) is intuitively 
telic, as reflected in the acceptability of the optional telic PP in an hour. As suggested 
above, this adverbial is telic because it requires that its argument be telic. Since only the 
proposition evaluated relative to the Event Time is technically telic, and not that 
evaluated at the Speech Time, this means that the adverbial must take narrow scope 
relative to the Past tense, so that the shift from the Speech Time to the Event Time will 
have already taken place. 
In the English progressive counterpart of ( ISa), Frida was rehearsing the libretto for an 
hour, the PP adverbial is taken to have narrow scope relative to the Past tense, but it may 
either take wide or narrow scope relative to the progressive -ing. If we give the adverbial 
wide scope over the progressive, the truth conditions require that there was actually one 
hour of rehearsal (though the whole libretto may not have been rehearsed); with narrow 
scope, the (presumably intended) hour of rehearsal may not have been completed. With 
either scope, the whole atelic proposition Frida be rehearsing the libretto for an hour 
then serves as argument to the Past tense. 
Similarly, although we may speak of the telicity of any predicate or clause, in the 
discussion of the imperfecto andpreterito examples in (10-13), (15) and (17-18) above, 
the telicity in question pertains to Event Times, and not to the time of evaluation for the 
examples. But in Spanish this leads to a problem for compositionality. E.g., in ()Sa), the 
imperfecto contributes both Past tense and habitual or progressive aspect: 
(15) a. Frida ensayaba el libreto par una hara. 
Frida rehearse .IMPF the libretto for an hour 
'Frida used to rehearse/was rehearsing the libretto for an hour.' 
In order to characterize the sense in which the imperfecto is atelic, we must talk about 
the habitual or progressive past event, i.e. telicity is determined with respect to material 
under the scope of the Past tense. But unlike English, in languages like Spanish the tense 
and aspect may be combined in one morphological form, as is the case in the imperfecto. 
In order to explain the aktionsart properties of por una hara and to detive all the possible 
readings for examples like (!Sa), the PP must take scope which is internal (cf. Dowty 
I979:250ff) to the lexical meaning of the impe1j'ecto, i.e. having narrow scope with 
respect to the tense contribution of the imperfecto but wide scope with respect to the 
aspectual contribution. While this can be accomplished technically, as we will show in 
the following section, it illustrates a whole range of problems with adverbi_als in various 
languages, problems which surely deserve a deeper insight into the semantics of 
adverbials than we can provide here. 
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§3 A truth conditional account of the semantics of the iinperfecto and preterito 
§3.1 Eventualities and situations 
)\'lost previous truth conditional characterizations of the aktionsarten have assumed a 
possible worlds semantics with temporal primitives which arc either intervals, as in 
Dowty's definitions (5) and (8) above. or events (or eventualities), as in Hinrichs ( I985). 
Hinrichs characterizes atelic eventualities in terms of the cumulative property: they are 
those eventualities such that two of the same type, such as two eventualities of running, 
join to give a third, combined eventuality of the same, running type. Tclic eventualities 
never display this property. Hinrichs' approach, thus, is an event analogue to Dowty's 
definitions of aktionsarten in terms of intervals. When we switch to a situation 
semantics, we need to address the relationship between intervals, events and situations. 
Portner ( 1992) offers a detailed analysis of the English progressive aspect in a situation 
semantics. He suggests. without argument, that we view an event as a situation, a 
situation which is minimal in that it includes all and only the participants in the event and 
\crifies that they swnd in the appropriate relations entailed by that participation but no 
others: 
A situation is a minimal situation in which c runs irf it contains nothing 
irrelevant to the truth of c nms, in the sense that rf any part of it were 
taken awav. we would sav that we no longer had the whole of e's run 
anymore. It will therefore be a rather abstract situation. [Portner 1992:6 I] 
He then follows Kamp ( 1979) in giving temporal relations between events directly in the 
model, so that we needn't take intervals to be primitive. We will follow Portner in 
viewing events as minimal situations; but he does not address the question of how to 
characterize the aktionsarten in these terms. Herc, we briefly note a couple of the central 
issues involved and suggest one path to resolving them. 
In Krntzer's situation semantics, a situation is a partial world, and a part-of relation is 
defined over the set of all situations. ln what follows, s < s' iff situation .1· is a proper part 
of situations'; the relation ::; is the super-relation of< which admits of equality as well; 
> and ~ are their inverse relations, as usual. Since Kratzer doesn't treat tense or time, the 
part-of relation between situations is presumably based at least partly on spatial partiality, 
as well as perhaps other more abstract properties. Each .situation is part of one and only 
one possible world, with the latter a maximal situation, i.e. one which is part of no other 
situation. If we extend this conception to con.sider time, we have world histories instead 
of worlds. Their parts. the situations, intuitively have two dimensions, a spatial extension 
and a temporal extension.' If situation s is a proper part of situation s', then s is 
presumably a proper spatial part and/or a proper temporal part of s'. In a temporally 
extended situation s. not only may emities have properties, but things may happen, i.e. 
change, as well. so that the properties which entities in s have in its initial subsituations 
rnay differ from those they have in its final subsituations. Such a situation sounds very 
much like an event, especially if we follow Portner in abstracting away from extraneous 
entities and simultaneous occurrences to make s minimal with respect to the realization 
of some type of event. 
An event semantics along the general lines of the theory in Hinrichs (1985) uses 
quantification over events in the object language. Jf we assume, following de Swart 
( 1992) and contra Kratzer ( 1988), that in such a semantics all predicates, both stage-level 
and individual-level, carry an event argument, and further, if we take events to be a type 
of situation. then this quantification over events amounts to quantification over situations. 
~It is conceivable thnt there are other, more abstract dimensions of n situation, but we won't consider that 
possibility here. 
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But then, in a situation semantic framework of the sort assumed here, we can get much 
the same semantics without object language event quantification. This is because the 
situation of evaluation for a given clause plays the role of a witness situation (the event or 
its super-situation) for such a quantification. That is, the truth of the expression in the 
situation of evaluation entails the existence of a verifying situation, obviating the need to 
assert its existence in the object language. 
In classical Montague Grammar (e.g. Montague 1973), natural language constituents are 
interpreted relative to an index of evaluation which includes both a world, and a time 
(now generally assumed to be an interval); we'll call the latter the time of evaluation. If 
we use a temporally extended situation instead of a world as a parameter of the index of 
evaluation for a constituent (call this parameter the situation of evaluation, or EvalS), we 
need to consider what relationship the temporal extension of that situation should have to 
the time of evaluation (the EvalT, an interval). Note that there must be some restriction 
on the relationship between the Eva!S and the Eva!T. What would it mean to interpret an 
utterance relative to an EvalT which was not a subinterval of the temporal extension of 
the EvalS? Surely something cannot be true in a situation at a time other than that.of the 
situation itself. And super-intervals of the temporal extension of EvaJS won't do either, 
as they might crucially include entities or eventualities which are not in EvaJS. Let us 
define a function on situations, Time, which assigns to each situation its temporal 
extension, an interval. We don't want to say that Rosa built a house in situation s if it 
took longer than Time(s) to build the house. We can say she was building the house 
during s, but that's not the same, of course. So, if we have an independent EvalT, we 
need to guarantee that for all EvalT, EvaJS, EvalT ~t Time(EvalS), where ~ 1 is the 
temporal subinterval relation on pairs of intervals. But this, in turn, suggests that we 
might manage without the EvalT and this ad hoc stipulation if we use Time(EvalS) in 
place of EvalT in our interpretation. That is, the temporal extension of the situation of 
evaluation now serves intuitively as the Event Time of the eventuality described. 
We can either assume that our model has intervals as primitive elements, with temporal 
relations defined over them and hence indirectly over situations in terms of their value 
under Time; or else, following Portner ( 1992), we can assume that situations have 
temporal relations defined directly over them. In the latter case, we can define times and 
intervals, if we need them, in terms of the temporal relations over situations; again, this 
would follow Kamp's (1979b) definition of times and intervals in terms of primitive 
temporal relations over events ..The way we model temporal relations over situations 
doesn't matter here, so we won't choose between these approaches. Whether we take· 
times to be primitive elements of the model or defined, they can serve as the value of the 
function Time over situations. In either case, we will want to guarantee that the temporal 
dimension of a situation, as captured by the Time function, corresponds to our intuitions 
about the relationship between situations and their temporal extensions. Among other 
things, we will want the following to be true: 
( 19) For all s, s', ifs~ s', then Time(s) ~ Time(s'). 
I.e., ifs is a sub-situation of s', then their times are appropriately related as well. 
One more difficulty remains. Kratzer ( 1989) argues that propositions ought to be 
persistent, in order to get the correct semantics for counterfactual conditionals. As usual, 
a proposition is a set of situations, those in which it is true: 
(20) Persistence in Situation Semantics [Kratzer 1989:616] 
A proposition p E P(S) is persistent iff for all sands' e S the following holds: 
Whenever s ~ s' and s e p, then s' E p. 
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What this means is that if a proposition is true in a situation s, then it must be true in all 
the supersituations of s, including the maximal situation, or world, Ws, of which s is part. 
Assuming that Kratzer's argument is sound, then we will want to require persistence of 
propositions in our situation semantics enriched with times, as well. The problem is that 
if we require persistence of propositions and take the primitives in terms of which we 
define aktionsarten to be situations instead of primitive events or intervals, then we must 
take care to avoid imposing conflicting requirements on the interpretation of clauses, 
arising from their telicity and persistence. 
To see the problem, consider how we might define the aktionsarten in such a framework. 
·First we consider the preliminary, simple definition of atelicity in (21): 
(21) A clause (or formula) ¢ expresses an atelic proposition iff for all situations s, 
[[¢]JS= I ifffor alls'~ s, [[¢]JS'= l. 6 · 
Since the set of situations which are parts of s will include those which are temporal 
parts of s, (21) rriight seem to capture Dowty's subinterval property for atelic aktionsarten 
in (5), the latter defined in terms of the intervals at which certain (atelic) predicates hold 
of a set of arguments. 
(5) The Subinterval Property for Atelic Aktionsarten 
If 8 is an atelic predicate, then necessarily, 8(x1 ,... ,x11 ) is true for interval/ 
if and only if 8(x1 ,... ,x11 ) is true for all subintervals /' of/. [Dowty 1987] 
Now suppose we try to extend this approach to develop the analogue of Dowty's (8) in 
situation semantic terms, as in (22): 
(8) If 8 is a telic predicate, then the truth of 8f.x1 ,... ,x11) for interval I entails that 
8f.x1 ,...,x,,) is false for all proper subintervals /' of/. [Dowty 1987] 
(22) A clause (or formula) ¢ expresses a telic proposition iff for all situations s such that 
[[¢]]'=I, for alls'< s, [[¢]]'' =0. . 
(22) does mirror (8), but if we require persistence of propositions, this will mean that 
there can be no telic propositions. For persistence requires that if [[¢JP' = I, then for all 
s" such thats< s", [[¢]]""=I. So long ass isn't a world history (and recall that Portner 
assumes that events are minimal situations, which won't be world histories in any 
reasonably realistic model), persistence would entail that ¢ is true in both a situation, s", 
and its sub.situations., precluding telicity as defined in (22). 
Further, consider a clause ¢, of the form Marfa tom6/tomaba cerveza, 'Marfa drank beer', 
atelic by the usual tests (again, considering the Event Time of Maria's drinking, and not 
the Speech Time). Suppose that this is true by virtue of the fact that Marfa is drinking 
beer in some past situations, which is not itself a world history, and that she is drinking 
beer in all of the subsituations of s, reflecting its intuitive atelicity; Time(s) will then be 
the Event Time of Maria's drinking. By persistence, Marfa will also have to be drinking 
beer in the world history of which s is a part, Ws . But surely she wouldn't be drinking 
beer in all the subsituations of w s. Even if she's a drunkard, Marfa has to sleep 
'This is a bit too strong. As Hinrichs ( 1985) discusses at length, even in relatively homogeneous 
eventualities, such as processes like walking, there are subeventualities which are so small that they are too 
small to identify as eventualities of walking; they might be identifiable as eventualities of lifting a foot or 
flexing a heel, but aren't sufficiently temporally extended to be differentiated from a standing in place and 
lifting one foot. We could modify (21) to take this into account, requiring thats' be sufficiently temporally 
extended to be a q,-ing, but for simplicity, we'll just ignore this refinement in this and subsequent 
definitions, as Dowty does in his interval-based definition of atelicity. 
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sometime! But then Maria's drinking beer would be true of a situation, Ws, but not of all 
of its subsituations, so that the clause would not satisfy the definition of atelicity in (21 ). 
Hence, we could not reflect the atelicity of¢ under (21) while maintaining persistence, 
without imposing a very unrealistic requirement on its truth in the model. 
Finally, another problem with (21) is that it requires the truth of ¢ even in the 
subsituations of the past situation s which, while they may be in principle temporally 
extensive enough to contain fings, are spatially radically smaller than s, to such an 
extent that they are too small to contain all of the individuals which play central roles in 
ef>-ing. This is clearly too strong a requirement. 
(23) retains the simple indexing schema argued for above, without temporal indices, 
while avoiding some of the pitfalls of (21 ). In it, Space is a function from situations to 
their spatial extensions; it is used to keep the spatial parameter stable while permitting the 
temporal to vary: 
(23) Atelicity in a Situation Semantics 
A clause (or formula) <)> expresses an atelic proposition iff for all situations s, 
[[<)>]ls= 1 iffthere is ans' :s; s such that [[<)>]]5' = I and for alls" :s; s' such that 
Space(s') = Space(s"), [[ID]]'"= I, as well. 
Here, s' intuitively plays the role of Partner's event at which ¢ is true, though we haven't 
directly required that it be an event in his sense; rather, the existence of a ¢ event, which 
might be a subsituation of s', is entailed by (23). By (23), if¢ is true at s, it is true at w, 
as well, guaranteeing persistence. But we don't thereby require its truth at all 
subsituations of w,., any more than its truth at all subsituations of s itself; hence, atelicity 
is compatible with persistence. The role of Event Time is implicitly played by Time(s'), 
the temporal extension of the eventuality corresponding to ¢ ; Time(s') may well be a 
proper subinterval of Time(s). 7 Further, we only require the truth of¢ in all of those 
subsituations of s' which are spatially co-extensive with s', not in those which are too 
small in some sense. 
In order to define a corresponding notion of telicity, then because of persistence we first 
need to define (rather roughly) what it is for a situation to be a minimal situation in which 
a given event-type occurs. (24) adapts to a situation semantics with times Partner's 
( 1992) notion of a minimal situation in which a proposition is true: 
(24) A situations is </)-minimal iff [[<!>ll'·ST = 1 and all elements of the non-temporal 
dimension(s) of s are necessary to its being a </>-ing. 
Hence, a ¢-minimal situation should be viewed as a rather long, very thin space/time 
worm (cf. Cooper 1986, Kratzer 1989). Note that given an atelic proposition ¢, a ¢­
minimal situation s will typically be such that proper subsituations of s are also ¢­
minimal situations (proper sub-worms of the super </>-minimal situation), in accordance 
with the distributivity required by (23). We will make use of this property to distinguish 
them from situations of a telic eventuality-type: 
7We also may need to assume that situations, like intervals, are temporally dense, which we do not find 
objectionable. Further, there is still the issue oft11e tempornlly minimnl size nt which an eventun!ity may 
be true. Suppose that an intuitively telic proposition happens to be true at a situation of temporally minimal 
size. Then it's the case that the proposition is technically alelic, because it's true at all the subsituations of 
that minimally-sized situation; there just don't happen to be any proper subsituations. This is undesirable. 
But note that (5) presents the same problems (and (21) as well). For if i happens to be the minimal interval 
that's temporally extended enough for </J to be true in it, then it's also trivially true that ¢ is true at all 
temporally minimally subintervals of i. 
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(25) 'Telicity in a Situation Semantics 
A clause ¢ expresses a telic proposition iff for all situations s ifs is ¢-minimal, 
then there is nos' such thats' < s and [[qi]]'':: l. 
Note that precluding subsituations of s in which ¢ is true entails that there are no 
temporally proper sub-situations of s at which ¢ is true. 
Now consider the following: 
(26) Marfa tom6 cerveza. 
Maria drink.PRET beer 
'Maria drank beer.' 
(27) Marfa tom6 una cerveza. 
Marfa drink.PRET a beer 
'Maria drank a beer.' 
Under Dowty's characterization of atclicity and telicity. intuitively (26) is c1telic, (27) telic 
(under the scope of the past tense), judgments which are reflected in the acceptabilitv of 
adverbials: atelic por una hora is fine for (26), odd with (27), while telic en /Ill{/ horn is 
fine for (27) but odd with (26). As in examples (9-13), this difference in aktionsart stems 
from the difference between a mass argument, cerveza. and a count argument, wrn 
cerveza, and not from the verb tomar or the preterito, both of which are neutral with 
respect to aktionsart. Suppose we take the logical form of these examples to be as in (26') 
and (27'): 
(26') PAST[<!> PRET-ASP ftomar (Marfa,cerveza)]J 
(27') PAST[,v PRET-ASP [tomar (Marfa,una cerveza)]] 
By (23), if¢ in (26') is true in a (past) situations, then this will require the existence ins 
of an atelic event of Maria's drinking beer, i.e. a subsituation s' of s during all of whose 
spatially co-extensive subsituations she also drank beer. The object cet-i-ew is a mass 
noun; hence whatever its denotation, the material parts of that denotation are also in the 
denotation of cerveza (see Link l 983)8• Thus, any temporal part of a period of drinking 
some maximal amount of cerveza will contain a proper part of that maximal amount 
which is also drunk (see Krifka l 986, l 987). Further, if it is true that Maria drinks beer 
in s, it will also be true in w.,·, satisfying persistence; but she needn't he a drunkard, 
drinking beer at all the subintervals of w.,· itself. 
Suppose that (27) is true by virtue of two past beer drinking situations. so that 1/f in (27') 
is minimally true in both s and s', where w.,·' = w,. huts and s' arc non-identical, 
temporally non-overlapping situations. Then by persistence, tp is still true in IVs' = w,. , 
i.e. it's true in that world history that Mary drinks a beer. This seems quite reasonable to 
us; even though we can also say that she drinks two beers in that world history (and in the 
join of s ands' which is also part of it), that shouldn't mean that she doesn't also drink 
one. This is a problem, we think, for Dowty's definitions, according to which l\faria 
couldn't be said to have drunk a beer at Time(ws') or at the join of Time(s) and Timc(s'). 
But under (25), as in Dowty's account, (27) still expresses a tel ic proposition, because 
(25) precludes the existence of a temporally proper subsituation s" of either s ors' 
during which time Mary drank a beer. It takes just so long to drink a beer; any less is a 
beer-drinking, but not the drinking of a beer. So the proposition expressed by (27) is 
non-atelic, as desired, though persistent. 
11 at least down to the level where there are sufficient molecules of the Jpproprintc ~ort in solution. 
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We will henceforth assume the definitions of the aktionsarten given in (23) and (25), 
along with the simple indexing schema they presuppose. 
§3.2 lmperfecto 
§3,2.1 Truth conditions for the imperfecto 
Our truth conditions for the imperfecto involve a single core meaning, given in 
preliminary form in (30) below; for simplicity, this definition ignores the issue of the 
imperfecto-internal scopes of temporal adverbials, discussed in §2 above, a deficiency 
which will be remedied below. What we offer is basically a modal interpretation. of the 
imperfecto , as indicated by the universal quantification over worlds w' . It has two 
subcases, involving two possible types of domain restriction on the universal 
quantification; these are given in terms of permissible modal accessibility relations R in 
cases (a) and (b). Case (a) captures the progressive interpretation of the impe,fecto , case 
(b) the habitual. We will argue in §4 that the other purported senses of the imperfecto 
are in fact subcases of one of these two. · 
(28) s <ts' iff s and s' are part of the same world and s temporally precedes s' 
(29) ST= the Speech Time of an utterance, technically the situation in which it is 
uttered, whose temporal dimension then corresponds to the Reichenbachian notion 
of Speech Time. 
(30) Meaning of the hnperfecto (Preliminary) 
[[IMPERF$JJ5,ST = I iff 
3s' b w s [s' <t ST & 
'v's"[R(s",s') ""7 [[$]]'",ST= l] & 
'v's"[s" ~s· ""7 'v's"'[R(s"',s") ""7 [[$]]"",ST= l]ll, 
where either: 
(a) Progressive case: R = { <s,s'>: sis an inertia-situation for s'], or 
(b) Habitual case: R = { <s,s'>: sis a characteristic subsituation of s' J 
The core import of (30) can be paraphrased as follows: IMPERF$ is true.in a situations 
if and only if there is some situations' (in the same world history ass ) which is past 
with respect to the Speech Time (ST) and </J is true in every situations" ·which is related 
to s' in the appropriate fashion R . In addition, the truth of </J is preserved under R for 
the subsituations of s' as well; i.e. every subsituation s" of s' must be such that at all the 
situations s'" which are related to s" in the same fashion .R are also such .that </J is true 
at s"' .9 There are thus, .in addition to the modal accessibility relation R, two parts of the 
meaning of the imperfecto : the Past tense, reflected in the requirement that s' be past 
relative to the Speech Time, and the atelic aspect, reflected in the additional assumption, 
the subinterval property required of s'. Requiring thats' be past relative to the Speech 
Time makes the Spanish imperfecto an absolute tense, in the sense that its temporal 
location is always determined relative to the Speech Time, even in embedded clauses; cf. 
Korean (Yoo, Yoon this volume) for an example of a language where embedded clauses 
are interpreted relative to the event time of their embedding clauses instead. 
''We will not give a complete fragment for Spanish. We assume, as usual fonenseless <jl, that [[ <j,J] s,ST = I 
iff ,p is verified by s. E.g. for a basic formula, the arguments of the predicate must stand in the relation 
denoted by the predicate in s. 
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In (30a), we adopt a notion of the progressive modified from Dowty's ( 1979) definition. 
Crucial to this definition is the notion of an inertia situation, modelled after his notion of 
an inertia world; cf. also Partner's ( 1994) inertia events. Intuitively, an inertia situation 
for a situation s is one which begins just likes, but continues in the way that s would 
continue were there no interference with the course of events as they have developed up 
to that point. Of course, in reality the course of events is often interrupted; e.g., Freda 
might be in the midst of baking a cake but receive a phone call and never finish it. So the 
progressive is in this respect like modality, in that it makes reference to possibly 
unrealized situations. 1° Further, we require that an inertia situation for a given Eva!S 
continue on beyond Time(Eva!S), the interval at which the progressive is asserted to be 
true: 11 
(31) Constraint on the Inertia-Situation Relation 
For alls, ifs' is an inertia-situation for s, then there is ans" which is a temporally 
final subsituation of s' and which properly temporally follows s, i.e. which is such 
thats <ts". 
Like the inertia-situation relation, the characteristic counterpart relation referred to in 
(30b) is modal, in the sense that they shift from one situation of interpretation to another; 
however, unlike inertia situations, characteristic subsituations of a given situation are all 
in the same world. This will follow from our definition if we assume, following Kratzer, 
that the subsituation relation holds only over situations in the same world. In this sense, 
the habitual reading has a realis character not displayed by the progressive. But not all 
subsituations of a situations are characteristic subsituations. The latter are subsituations 
which are normal or usual in some sense, a sense given by the meaning of the utterance in 
question and its context. With respect to (30b), since s is a subsituation of s', and hence 
they are in the same world, habitual readings are about what someone has actually done 
on typical occasions, and not, as with the progressive, about what would have been if 
things had gone on as they were. 
Given these assumptions, the two subcases of (30) in (a) and (b) give rise to truth 
conditions which we can paraphrase as in (30a') and (30b'): 
(30) a'. Progressive: 
Impeifecto ij> is true in a situations if and only if there is an intervals' which is 
past relative to ST and'lj> is true at every inertia situation for s', as well as at 
every inertia situation for all the subsituations of s. I.e.,¢ would have been true 
if things had gone on as they were. 12 
b', Habitual: 
Imperfecro ¢ is true in a situation s if and only if there is an interval s' which is 
past relative to ST and ¢ is true at every characteristic subsituation associated 
withs', as well as at every characteristic subsituation associated with the 
subsituations of s', 
'"Abusch (1985) argues that in a treatment of the progressive along the l:nes of Dowly's (1979) we cannot 
make do with a single accessibility relation picking out inertia worlds, but rather that there might be 
different inertia worlds determined by various aspecls of !he situation described by the progrnssive. We 
will not consider this possibility here, but note 1hat 1he rela1ion R in ou1· definition (30) might be modified 
to be a function which picks out accessibility relations on 1hc basis of contcxlual factors, in order 10 reflec1 
Abusch's modification of Dowty. 
"The definition in (31) only works as desired if we assume !hat situations in different world hislories are 
temporally comparable. 
"By this, we intend no counterfactunl implication. Le., !he lruth of i111pe1fecto(¢) is compatible wilh the 
subsequent truth of¢. 
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Since all the subsituations of s' must be such that.their subsituations also have only 
inertia situations or characteristic subsituations that verify ¢, this will guarantee that if ¢ 
is true at s', it will also be true at all its subsituations as well. This is just whatwe need 
to guarantee atelicity under (23). Hence, (30) entails that the imperfecto will always 
yield atelic aktionsart (under the scope of the Past tense). 
We noted that (30) is preliminary in virtue of the fact that it ignores the internal adverb 
problem. We will propose a technical solution to this problem which in.volves leaving 
the translation of Imperf¢ open to the introduction of adverbials with scope under the 
Past tense but wider than the aspectual portion of its meaning. We do this by changing 
the logical type of Imperf ¢ from that of a sentence, i.e. type t, to a function from 
adverbials to sentence-type objects." As usual in Montague Grammar, ¢' is the 
translation of the constituent ¢ into a formula of intensional logic, its logical form: 
(32) Meaning of the lmperfecto (final) . 
IMPERF$'= A-Adv[PAST(Adv[ASP1MPF$])], where PAST, Adv, and ASP1MPF are 
of type tit, and: 
[[PAST\jl]]s,ST = I iff3s' !::;; Ws [s' <t ST & [[\jl]]s',ST = I] 
[[ASP1MP~]]5',ST = I iff 
'v's"[R(s",s') ~[[$]]'",ST= I] & 
'v's"[s" ~ s' ~ 'v's"'[R(s"',s") ~[[$]]''",ST= I]], 
where either: 
(a) Progressive case: R = { <s,s'>: sis an inertia-situation for s'}, or 
(b) Habitual case: R = { <s,s'> : s is a characteristic subsituation of s') 
Under this translation and interpretation, IMPERF¢ is of type (tlt)lt, taking a sentential 
adverbial, such as en una hara or por una hara, to yield an expression of type t. We 
could impose further, sorta! restrictions on the adverbials which can serve as internal 
adverbs in this translation, but we won't investigate that here. In order to account for the 
possibility of iterating these adverbials, we can push up their type so that the adverbials 
take IMPERF¢' as argument, yielding an expression of the same type, (tlt)lt. In case the 
sentence takes no adverbials, we can use a dummy adverbial as argument to (32), 
basically an identity function. In such a case, the combined translation and 
interpretations of PAST and ASP tMPF in (32) yield the same interpretation as the earlier 
(30). Note that the possibility of introducing adverbial meanings internal to the 
interpretation of the imperfecto does not preclude permitting the same adverbials to take 
narrower or wider scope than the imperfecto. 
One final note: (30)/(32) do not guarantee that the situations" at which ¢ is true is itself 
in the past. The definition could be easily modified to ensure this. However, we have not 
done so because of intentional examples like (33): 
(33) Juan dijo que venia maiiana. 
Juan said.FRET that come.3sg.IMPF tomorrow 
'Juan said that he was coming tomorrow.' 
In (33), the intended event of John's coming corresponding to the complement clause is 
specified to be realized, if at all, after the speech time. We will argue in the following 
section that intentional readings of the imperfecto are a type of progressive, so that all 
"Dowty ( 1979:332ff) argues that aspectual adverbials like i11 an hour and for an ho«r should be VP 
adverbs, of type IV/IV. Notice that that is not open to us here: the scope of the tense portion of the 
meaning of the imperfecto is clearly sentential, type t in the translation offered, and hence that of the 
aspectual potion of its meaning must be too. Hence adverbials taking intermediate sCope between these 
two portions must take type t arguments (the result of adding the aspectual meaning to the basic clause 
meaning) to yield a type t argument for the tense portion of the meaning, i.e. be of type rlt. 
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readings of the Spanish imperfecto are covered by the cases given in (30)/(32) above. 
Given (33), then, we do not want to guarantee thats" in (32) be in the past with respect 
to the time of evaluation (for (33), the Speech Tirne). 
§3.2.2 Accounting for available readings of the imperfecto 
\low let us return briefly to review the data in the first section, and show how our truth 
conditions for the unpe1fecto account for them. We have already discussed how the 
aktionsart for the impe1fecto are constrained to be atclic. We also see that the 
progressive and habitual readings of the impe,fecto are straightforward examples of 
cases (a) and (b) of [32), respectively. It remains only to discuss how the intentional and 
iterative readings of the imperfecto arise. 
First, with respect to the intentional reading. note that we might try to derive it by adding 
a thin] clause to (32), as in (32c): 
(32) c. Intentional: 
R= ( <s,s'>: sis a situation realizing the intentions ins' of the agent ins} 
And placing the condition in (34) on the ,·elation of being a situation (world-time pair) 
which realizes an agent's intentions: 
(34) Constraint on the Intentional Realization Relation: 
For all s, s', ifs realizes someone's intentions ins', then there is ans'' which is a 
final-subinterval of sand which properly follows s', i.e. which is such thats'< s", 
and the realization of the agent's intentions is concluded ins". 
However, apart from the problem of trying to define what it is to be the agent of a 
situation (which would stucly require relativization to a particular event-type realized in 
that situation), we believe that adding (32c) is neither necessary nor sufficient to capture 
all the relevant readings, and that it is preferable instead to treat them as subcases of the 
progressive interpretation of the i111pe1fecf() . First, to see that such an addition would not 
be sufficient, notice that there are examples of a reading which is very close to the 
intentional but which does not involve an agent. This is exemplified by (35) and (36): 14 
(35) El mccanismo ue autodestrucci6n se detonaba en 30 minutos. 
The mechani,m of self-destruction detonate .IMPF in 30 minutes 
'The self-destructing mechanism would be activated in 30 minutes.' 
(36) Eran las 6. Los campesinos comcnzaron a preparar cl fuego. 
be.IMPF 6. the peasants start.PRET to prepare the fire 
El sol se ponfa a las 6:50. 
The sun 3-REFL set.JMPF at 6:50 
'It was 6 o'clock The peasants started to prepare the fires. The sun would set at 
6:50.' 
But also, under certain assumptions about what constitutes an event. (32c) is just a 
subcase of (32a), i.e. the existence of such readings would be predicted by our truth 
conditions for the progressive. The main assumption we require is that an event may 
1 Jin the c:1se of example (35 ), even though the pre~ence of nn agent is not explicit, one can assume th,1t 
there has been some agent involved in the programming of the mechanism In (36), however, no 
connection to an agent ean be established. 
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consist-not enly of the changes in.state typically associated with that type.of event (see 
Dowty 1977); but also with what Moens & Steedman ( 1988) C!\11 a preparatory process: a 
subpart of the event _before any. culmination ( of the change of state) occurs, during which 
the preparations for its occurrence are completed. If this assumption is made, then the 
_JMPF4J might be trne under the progressive readjng.if the preparatory phase of 41-ing is 
underway. . . . . · . · · 
In a similar though not quite identical fashion, Partee (1984) discusses the possibility 
that, in order to derive the correct semantics for temporal adverbial clauses i~ examples 
like (37), we might think of an event of throwing a party l!8 including not just the actual 
party, but also the planning, sending the invitations, preparing 'the food, etc.: 
(37) When Juanita threw ~ party, she spent a_long time _preparing the food. : . · 
If we include the period during which one holds intentions to perform,sm;ne act as part of 
the preparatory phase of an extended.event, then the extended evenfis in.progress during 
the preparatory phase, during the period when one holds those iiiterliions. If one's 
intentions are carried out.as planned, then in all the inertia situations corresponding.to 
that period,. the event itself will come about. From this perspective, tlie fotenticinal 
readings are a subtype of the progressive.. As is usual in the progress_ive, there is ho 
assumption -that the eventuality is fully realized. But the preparatory phase need not 
involve the intentions of a planner, yielding the intentional reading, but may instead 
simply reflect the fact that all the wheels are in motion which would ordin_arily lead to an 
event like the sun setting, as in (36). 
If intentional readings are subcases of the progressive interpretation of the imperfecto 
given in (32a), then we have to explain why the Spanish progressive does not give rise to 
such readings, as illustrated by the lack of an intentional reading in the past progressive 
counterpart to (3a) in (3b), discussed ear)ier. The fact that the Spanish progressive does 
not have the intentional reading supports our contention that the intentional reading arises 
from the meaning of the imperfecto itself, rather than, e.g., being the result of combining 
the imperfecto with a progressive operator (cf. ·oowty's 1979 compositional treatment of 
the English futurate progressive in this way). Our understanding of the Spanish 
progressive is that in some sense it can only be used to refer to events when the change of 
state in question is actually in progress, though not yet complete. 
To see what we mean, consider Moe;:ns & Steedman's suggested internal structure 9f telic 
events: 
(38) Moens & Steedman's ( 1988) internal st~cture of a telic event ("Nucleus"i 
preparatory process consequent state · 
II/IIllIIII I II II II// II II II II II IIII II Ill III II II II I/IIII II II II II IIIIIllII II II IIII 
I 
culmination 
They argue that what the preparatory process involves might be interpreted differently for 
different exampl_es, these differences arising, presumably, from real-world pragmatic 
knowledge plus the truth conditions of the examples involved. One type of consti'ual 
would be where this process comprises the actual beginning of the change of state which 
leads to the culmination, as in the progressive reading of the imperfecto in examples like 
(2b ), repeated here: 
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(2) b. Ibamos a la playa cuando nos encontramos con Miguel. 
go-lplu.IMPF tothebeach when RECPR.meet-lplu.PRET with Miguel 
'We were going to the beach when we ran into Miguel.' (progressive) 
But another would be where the preparatory process would comprise something like a 
planning phase, as in examples like (37) or, as we argued, the intentional readings of 
examples like (2d): 
(2) · d. Hasta ayer, ibamos · a la playa de vacaciones, 
- until yesterday go- I plu.IMPF to the beach on vacation 
pero hoy Pepa dijo que no hay dinero para eso. 
but today Pepa say-3sg. PRET that not there is money for that 
'Up until yesterday we were going to the beach on vacation but today Pepa said 
that there is no money for that.' (intention-in-the past) 
But if the Spanish progressive is only felicitous in examples like (2b), and not in those 
like (2d), then some differentiation must be made between the two types of preparation 
for change of.state. We seem to need something more like (39): · 
(39) 
preparatory phase· process consequent state 




change of state 
The culmination is point-like, i.e. temporally non-extended. In the complex telics (i.e. 
accomplishments), the change of state is more than the culmination; it is extended. We 
capture this by saying that there is a non-empty process leading to the culmination. In an 
achievement (simple telic), the process is empty. As a process of approaching the 
culmination, the pre-culmination portion of the change of state has a certain sort of 
homogeneity. But the preparatory phase is qualtitatively different from the change of 
state, including the pre-culmination process, and hence isn't homogeneous with the 
process: In the preparatory process, nothing is going on which would concretely lead to 
the change of state. The Spanish progressive may only refer to the pre-culmination 
process of the actual change of state associated with a telic eventuality, after the 
preparatory process, if any. 15 .. . 
Note that this account of the intentional readings predicts that they may arise with 
achievements as well as accomplishments. This is confirmed by the acceptability of 
examples like the following: 16 
"It is interesting to note that English, with no distinct imperfective past tense form, uses the past 
progressive to indicate the intentional reading, as we see in the translations in the intentional examples in 
(2) - (4). This supports the idea that the restriction on the interpretation of the Spanish progressive is 
probably designed to take advantage of the impetfecto vs. past progressive split to make as many semantic 
distinctions as possible. · . 
"We have chosen the complex achievement predicate empezar el regimen, with the inchoative aspectual 
verb empezar, because the intentional reading is generally easiest to get with agentive predicates, and, as 
Dowty (I 979: 124) notes, few, if any, simple achievement verbs involve agentivity. 
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(40) Maria empezaba el regimen el Junes. Pero hoy se enter6 
Maria begin .IMPF the diet the Monday but today learn .PRET 
que sus amigas le van a hacer una fiesta el Junes a la·noche, 
that her friends dat-3 go.PRES to make a party the Monday the evening 
asi que <;1ecidi6 no empezar hasta el otro lunes. 
so decide.PRET not begin until the other Monday 
'Marfa was going to start her diet on Monday. But today she learned that her · 
friends are going to throw a party for her Monday evening, so she· decided not to 
_start until the following Monday.' 
Since we are not ·principally concerned here with the progressive, we will not explore 
how the ontology of event-parts sketched in (39) should be realized in the semantics. We 
only offer this here by way of tentative explanation of the difference between the 
imperfecto and the Spanish progressive. · · 
At this point we would like to comment on the _iterative interpretation often attributed. to 
the impe,fecto (cf. Binnick 1991) or considered as a subtype of the habitual (cf. _Comrie 
1976), English examples like (41) cari only have iterative interpretations: 
(41) Stephen kicked the door for ten minutes. (iterative) 
(41) means that throughout a ten minute interval, Stephen repeatedly kicked the door. 
Spanish examples like (42) can have the same type of interpretation, but w_ithout the 
durative adverbial, in the appropriate type of context: 
(42) Esteban pateaba la puerta. 
Esteban kick .IMPF the door 
'Esteban was kicking/used to kick the door.' (progressive or habitual) 
We believe that the iterative interpretation of the imperfecto is a progressive 
interpretation, and furthermore, that the iterativity itself does not arise from the meaning 
of the imperfecto , but in another fashion. To see why, note that the obvious Spanish 
translation of the earlier English example (41) is (43), with the preterito, not (44), with 
the imperfecto : 
(43) Esteban pate6 la puerta par 10 minutos. 
Esteban kick.PRET the door for 10 minutes 
'Esteban kicked the door for ten minutes.' (iterative) 
(44) Esteban pateaba la puerta par IO minutos. 
Esteban kick .IMPF the door for IO minutes 
'Esteban used to kick the door for 10 minutes.' (habitual+ iterative) 
(45) Esteban pate6 la puerta. 
Esteban kick .PRET the door 
'Esteban kicked the door.' (default interpretation: telic) 
Standard accounts of the iterative interpretation of (41) assume that it comes not from the 
inherent meaning of kick the door, which is basically a simple telic, but from the 
necessity of reconciling this basic meaning with the durative adverbial for ten minutes, 
which only modifies an atelic event. Intuitively, since the duration of a kicking of a door 
is typically quite short and the associated event is telic, the only way to reconcile these 
two elements is to shift to an iterative interpretation of the main clause (resulting in 
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atelicity); a progressive interpretation would be odd because such an event ends almost 
immediately after it begins. Similarly, we would argue, in (43) the iterative interpretation 
comes not from the preterito itself, which is compatible with the basic telic aktionsart of 
the predicate, but is a zero-morphological shift necessitated by the need to reconcile that 
telicity with the durative adverbial. Then also in ( 44), which generally is taken to mean 
that Esteban habitually kicked the door (repeatedly) for 10 minutes, it is not the aspect 
which forces the iterative interpretation, but the same combination of a telic predicate and 
a durative adverbial. The difference between the preterito and the impe,fecto , however, 
is that an example like (44) but without the adverbial, as in (42), can have a progressive 
interpretation in the proper context: 'Esteban was in the process of repeatedly kicking the 
door', whereas ( 45) without the adverbial doe1(not have an iterative interpretation. Our 
treatment of the imperfecto as entailing atelicity predicts that the progressive 
interpretation of the impe,fecto is like a durative adverbial in forcing a non-complex telic 
to have an iterative interpretation in order to be atelic. So, though the iterative 
interpretation is forced by the imperfecto , it is not part of the meaning of the imperfecto 
itself, but is just another instance of a general strategy for reconciling the telicity of the 
main predicate with the atelic requirements of an element with wider scope, be it an atelic 
adverbial or the atelic aspect. In turn, this also would correctly predict that the iterative 
reading can arise with the past progressive construction as well. But nothing in the 
meaning of the preterito forces the shift to an iterative interpretation; in general, it seems 
that such shifts must be forced as in the impe,fecto cases; Hence, the preterito does not 
by itself yield iterative interpretations. 
Finally, note that the purportedly durative and continuous aspectual character of the 
imperfecto · are· accounted for by the subinterval property associated with its atelicity: 
durative in the same sense that the compatible durative adverbials are (and also see the 
discussion of Reference Time in §3.3.2), continuous in that. the subinterval property 
(here, more properly, a subsituation property) entails that there are no gaps in the 
eventuality concerned. We believe that the purported indefiniteness is really just by way 
of contrasting the imperfecto to a perceived definiteness of the preterito, and has no 
independent content that we can determine. 
§3.3 Preterito 
§3.3,1 Truth conditions for the preterito 
Presupposing the definitions in (46) and (47), (48) gives the truth conditions for clauses 
in the preterito : 
(46) s temporally overlaps s', ·s • s', iff, there is a situations" such that 
s" :,; s ands" :,; s'. 17 
(47) Situations is a temporally final sub-situation of situations', s SnnaJ s', iff 
Time(s) i:;;;1Time(s') and there is no s" S s' such that Time(s) <t Time(s"), 
(48) Meaning of the Preterito (preliminary version) 
[[PRET~]]s,ST = I iff 
3s' i;;; w s[s' <t ST & [s' <1 s vs' S s] & ~-minimal(s') & 
v's"[s" • s' & ~-minimal(s") ~ 
v's" 1[s" 1 Sfina(s" ~ 
3s' 1[s' 1Sfinal s' & (s"1 = s' 1vs" 1St s' 1)lll] 
17This follows from the assumption about the relationship between subsituations and their times, ( 19) 
above. 
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PRETI/) is true in a situation s if and only if there is a situation s' such that (a) s' is prior 
to the Speech Time; (b) s' is either prior to s or else a sub-situation of s ; ( c) s' is ¢­
minimal; and (d) all qr-minimal situations s" which overlaps' are such that all their 
temporally final subsituations either precede or are a temporally final subsituation of s'. 
The second disjunct of condition (b) makes persistence possible -- e.g., s might itself be 
w, . We call condition ( d) the end-point requirement of the preterito. The preterito 
permits past truth in overlapping situations and hence in supersituations, thus permitting 
atelic readings; but all these situations must end at a certain point, the end-point, which is 
intuitively the final moment of the largest ¢-minimal situation. Note that (48) doesn't 
require truth in overlapping situations, so that telic readings are possible as well. 
Note that (48) would permit PRETqi to be true in the situation s in the following 
diagram, where s', s", and s"' are all ¢-minimal situations and the subsituation of s" 




This is intuitively undesirable. However, note that in this case, ¢ would be neither telic 
nor atelic, by the definitions given in §3.1. Like those in Dowty (1979), those definitions 
fail to define a partition on the set of all possible propositions. We feel that this is 
appropriate; certainly it is possible to define a proposition in a predicate calculus which is 
neither telic nor atelic. Instead, the fact that all propositions expressed by natural 
languages are either telic or atelic is possibly a natural language universal of considerable 
interest, reflecting something about how we conceive of events and realize those 
conceptions in the lexical semantics for verbs and other predicate expressions. If so, it 
would be this natural language universal that would rule out the truth of PRETqi in the 
diagram described above, and no modification of (48) is required for this purpose. 
As with the imperfecto, aspectual adverbials typically take intermediate scope between 
the tense portion of the meaning of the preterito and the aspectual portion. Again, we 
will reflect this technically in our final definition by introducing an adverbial argument 
with intermediate scope, without pretending that we view this solution to be explanatory: 
(49) Meaning of the Preterito (final) 
PRET(jl' = t..Adv[PAST(Adv[ASPpR£r(jl])], where PAST, Adv, and ASPPRET are of 
type tit, and: 
[[PASTljl])S,ST = 1 iff 3s' s;; Ws[s' <t ST & [s' <ts vs' $ s] & [[1j1]]5',ST = !] 18 
[[ASPpREtqJ]]5',ST = 1 iff (jl-minimal(s') & 
Vs"[s" s' & (jl-minimal(s") --t0 
Vs" 1[s" I s;final s" --t 
3s' 1[s' I $finals' & 
(s" 1 = s' 1 vs" 1 $ts' 1)]]] 
As in (32), when the only adverbial applied to the translation and interpretations in ( 49) 
den6tes the identity function, the resulting interpretation is just a stepped-function version 
of that given in (48). 
"Note that this definition corresponds with the definition of PASTl/f in the truth conditions for the 
imperfecto in (32) above. 
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§3.3.2 Accounting for available readings of the preterito 
As noted in § l, the preterito may have either an atelic or a telic reading, depending on ·a 
number of other factors in the utterance in question, including .the predicate itself, the 
count vs. mass character of one or more of its arguments, and certain types of adverbials. 
With respect to. argument type, we. saw in examples (12) and ( 13) one instance of the sort 
of difference discussed in §2 using examples (26) and (27): 
(12) Corrio petr6leo par las caiierfas. 
flow-3sg.PRET oil through the pipes 
'Oil flowed through the pipes.' (atelic) 
(I 3) Corrieron 3000 litros de petr6leo par las caiierfas. 
flow-3plu.PRET 3000 liters of oil through the pipes 
'3000 liters ofoil flowed through the pipes.' (telic) 
(26) Marfa tom6 cerveza. 
Marfa drink.PRET beer 
'Maria drank beer.' 
(27) Marfa tom6 . una cerveza. 
Marfa drink.FRET a beer 
'Marfa drank a beer.' 
In (12), as in (26), drinking a certain portion ~f the substance denoted by the mass NP, 
here petr6leo, entails a number of sub-eventualities of drinking parts of that portion of 
substance. In ( 13), as in (27), the count noun suggests an eventuality in which the entire 
measure of the substance, here 3000 litros de petr6leo, has flowed through the pipes; no 
sub,eventuality would involve the entire 3000 liters, so the proposition would be atelic. 
As noted earlier, it is possible to contextually force an atelic reading in such cases, at 
least for (13) and ·its ilk, where it's possible to imagine the flowing as a continuous, 
circular process. However, the telic seems to be the default, though, as argued in §2, this 
is only due to conversational implicature. 
Now consider the use of the adverbials in (15c) and (15d), repeated here: 
(15) c. Frida ensay6 el libreto por una hora. 
Fridarehearse.PRET the libretto for an hour 
'Frida rehearsed the libretto for an hour.' (atelic: iterative or progressive) 
d. Frida ensay6 el libreto en una hora. 
Frida rehearse .PRET the libretto in an hour 
'Frida rehearsed the libretto in an hour.' (telic) 
When an atelic predicate such as por una hora in (]Sc) combines internally with the 
preterito, then the resulting interpretation must be atelic, by virtue of the fact that that 
adverbial itself requires distributivity of the proposition within its scope (see Dowty 1979 
for truth conditions of the corresponding English for an hour ). The truth conditions 
given in (49) are compatible with the definition of atelicity in (23), so long as the 
endpoint requirement is satisfied. When a telic predicate or a sentence with a telic 
adverbial like en una hora. 'in an hour' in (l 5d) combines internally with the preterito , 
the resulting aktionsart is telic. Nothing in the meaning of the preterito forces an atelic 
reading, and the telicity of the predicate or adverbial (again, see Dowty 1979 on. in mi 
· hour) would be inccimpatilile with an atelic interpretation. 
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Similarly, the adverbial a la tienda with the preterito in (17) suggests a goal which, 
once reached, defines a telic eventuality, leading to the default telic interpretation of ( 17). 
This contrasts with the imperfecto in (18), which can only have an atelic interpretation, 
and hence the habitual or progressive: 
(17) Juana corri6 a la tienda. 
Juana run.PRET to the store 
'Juana ran to the store.' (telic) 
(18) Juana corrfa a la tienda. 
Juana run .IMPF to the store 
'Juana ran/was running to the store.' (atelic: habitual or progressive) 
Again, we predict that an atelic reading of (17) is possible, but it seems to be strongly 
overridden here by the possibility of unequivocally atelic imperfecto (or the progressive). 
The only aielic reading possible for ( 17) is the habitual, e.g. with an adverbial like todos 
Los dias ; the progressive is not a possible reading. 
We take it that the endpoint requirement in (48-49) is the source of the notion that the 
preterito is aspectually terminative. The claim that it is definite, in the sense defined 
earlier, will be .true only when the preterito has a telic interpretation. When it is 
interpreted atelically, then a progressive-like reading i~ possible, one which does not 
denote an eventuality which is intuitively "entire", but only a subpart of the eventuality­
type typically associated with the predicate. 
We also noted that traditionally some authors have spoken of the preterito as punctual in 
character when compared to the durative imperfecto . There is now a substantial 
literature on the use of the Reichenbachian notion of Reference Time in interpreting tense 
in natural language, and especially on how the aspect of an utterance both plays a role in 
the way in which the current Reference Time constrains its interpretation and also 
contributes to the determination of the Reference Time for subsequent utterances (see 
especially the work by Hinrichs 1981, 1986; Kamp 1981; Kamp & Rohrer 1983; and 
Partee 1984). Basically, these researchers claim that in discourse, eventualities correlated 
with atelic propositions (call these atelic eventualities, for short), such as those denoted 
by utterances with the Spanish imperfecto , are asserted to be temporally inclusive of the 
current Reference Time. Further, atelics do not establish a new Reference Time but 
simply pass along the current Reference Time at the time oftheir utterance; since a telic 
eventuality is taken to more or less immediately follow its Reference Time, atelics are 
often taken to also be temporally inclusive of a subsequently mentioned telic eventuality. 
On the other hand, telic eventualities are taken to follow the current Reference Time, and 
in turn to establish a new Reference Time for the following discourse. In short, telics 
tend to move the narrative forward; hence they act as indivisible eventualities. Atelics, 
on the other hand, do not move Reference Time forward but instead are taken to include 
any telic eventualities under discussion; they hence display duration. Kamp (1981) 
argues that this difference in the Reference Time functions for French correlates with the 
use of the passe simple versus the imparjait, and that this accounts for the often cited 
punctuality of French passe simple versus.the .durativity of the imparfait. However, at· 
least in Spanish (and we suspect in French, as well), we would argue that the correct 
distinction as to whether or not a new reference time is established should be atelic versus 
telic, rather than passe simple (preterito in Spanish) versus imparfait (Spanish 
imperfecto ). 19 Consider the following example: 
"Kamp (1981) ignores the issue of aktionsart in his analysis of French, as do Kamp & Rohrer (1983). 
Hinrichs (I 981, 1986), Partee (1984), and Dowty ( 1986) all argue convincingly that the differentiating 
factor for Reference Times in English is aktionsart. 
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(50) · a. Los guerreros se enfrentaron. 
the warriors RECFR-3FL confront.FRET 
b. Corrio mucha ·sangre. 
run .FRET much blood 
c. Los victoriosos quemaron la fortaleza. 
the victorious burn .FRET the fortress 
d. Fue una tragedia. 
be.FRET. a tragedy 
'The warriors confronted each other. A lot of blood ran. The victors burned the 
fortress. It was a tragedy.' 
All the verbs in this paragraph are in the preterito but only sentences (a) and (c) advance 
the narrative, i.e. establish a new Reference Time. (a) and (c) are telic while (b) and (d) 
are atelic, reflecting the fact that the preterito is compatible with both telicity and 
atelicity. But only those propositions which are telic may establish a new Reference 
Time, and it is precisely those cases in which the preterito is interpreted as punctual. 
Therefore, the punctuality of the preterito does not come about every time this form is 
used, but only when the resulting. utterance .receives a telic interpretation. Hence, 
aktionsart is finally the key to the full range of aspectual characteristics of the Spanish 
preterito and imperfecto, and the behavior of the preterito in contexts such as (50) is 
predicted by our truth conditions and the definitions of telicity and atelicity in §2. 
§4 Conclusion 
We have argued that aktionsart and aspect are. independent categories. Though Spanish 
has two aspectual variants in the past tense, the preterito and the imper:fecto, these do not 
display a one to one correlation with the two main types of aktionsart. Rather, both atelic 
and telic aktionsart may be ,displayed by the. preterito, though the imperfecto displays 
only atelic aktionsart. 
We laid the foundations of a truth conditional account of these forms within the 
framework of situation semantics, showing how Dowty's earli.er characterizations of the 
aktionsarten could be realized in this framework while retaining Kratzer's requi.rement of 
persistence. Given these assumptions, and Partner's notion of the minimality of a 
situation relative to a proposition, we provided relatively simple truth conditions for the 
Spanish past tense forms. In contrast to traditional claims that the imperfecto is 
ambiguous, with as many as four meanings (the progressive, habitual, intentional, and 
iterative), we claim that it is unambiguous and that the· subinterval property of the 
imperfecto (with varying contextual restrictions), along with variants on the modal 
accessibility built into the truth conditions, accounts for all the uses usually ascribed to it. 
In particular, what we have called the "intention in the past" reading of the imper:fecto 
gets a principled explanation which was absent from traditional accounts in the Spanish 
literature. Whether the resulting interpretation of the imperfecto involves ambiguity or 
not seems to us to be a terminological matter: if we take the two types of. modal 
accessibility which are permissible with the imper:fecto to define two distinct senses, then 
the form is ambiguous, but it is also clear that the two senses are essentially the same in 
another sense, with the accessibility relation chosen a relatively minor variation. We also 
offered truth conditions for the preterito which capture the fact that it is compatible with 
atelic, as well as telic ·readings. Finally, the truth conditions plus an understanding of 
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how aktionsarten influence Reference Time in discourse permitted us to elucidate the 
source of several traditional aspectual characterizations of the imperfecto and preterito. 
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